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Eye-trackinga b s t r a c t
The smooth transitions between turns in natural conversation suggest that speakers often
begin to plan their utterances while listening to their interlocutor. The presented study
investigates whether this is indeed the case and, if so, when utterance planning begins.
Two hypotheses were contrasted: that speakers begin to plan their turn as soon as possible
(in our experiments less than a second after the onset of the interlocutor’s turn), or that
they do so close to the end of the interlocutor’s turn. Turn-taking was combined with a
ﬁnger tapping task to measure variations in cognitive load. We assumed that the onset
of speech planning in addition to listening would be accompanied by deterioration in
tapping performance. Two picture description experiments were conducted. In both
experiments there were three conditions: (1) Tapping and Speaking, where participants
tapped a complex pattern while taking over turns from a pre-recorded speaker, (2) Tapping
and Listening, where participants carried out the tapping task while overhearing two
pre-recorded speakers, and (3) Speaking Only, where participants took over turns as in
the Tapping and Speaking condition but without tapping. The experiments differed in
the amount of tapping training the participants received at the beginning of the session.
In Experiment 2, the participants’ eye-movements were recorded in addition to their
speech and tapping. Analyses of the participants’ tapping performance and eye movements
showed that they initiated the cognitively demanding aspects of speech planning only
shortly before the end of the turn of the preceding speaker. We argue that this is a smart
planning strategy, which may be the speakers’ default in many everyday situations.
 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction rather than overlapping or being separated by long pausesA hallmark of natural conversation is turn-taking, with
interlocutors alternating in adopting the roles of listener
and speaker. Speakers normally manage to coordinate
their contributions to a conversation in such a way that
their utterances follow smoothly on from each other,(Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974). For instance, Stivers
et al. (2009) analysed a corpus of polar (yes/no) ques-
tion–answer sequences in ten languages and found that
the average interval between a question and the answer
was around 200 ms. Data from Dutch corpora containing
a range of different utterance types has provided a similar
estimate (Heldner & Edlund, 2010). Many authors have
stressed that natural conversations are characterised by
smooth transitions of turns (Sacks et al., 1974; Wilson &
Wilson, 2005). Moreover, there is good evidence that
inter-turn intervals can convey meaning; for instance, a
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reluctance to comply (Jefferson, 1989; Roberts & Francis,
2013; Roberts, Margutti, & Takano, 2011). Thus, speakers
know how to time their contributions appropriately.
However, very little is known about the way this timing
is achieved. Short inter-turn intervals and occasional over-
laps of turns indicate that speakers often begin to plan
their utterance while still listening to the other person
(De Ruiter, Mitterer, & Enﬁeld, 2006; Levinson, 2013;
Sacks et al., 1974). This is because planning a single
content word (e.g., a name of a picture) may take close to
a second (Indefrey & Levelt, 2004; Strijkers & Costa,
2011) and initiating a simple descriptive utterance, such
as ‘‘The donkey kicked the man’’, may take about two
seconds (Gleitman, January, Nappa, & Trueswell, 2007;
Grifﬁn & Bock, 2000).
But when do speakers begin to plan their turns? Do they
typically begin to plan an utterance as soon as they have a
rough idea what they might say, or do they only begin to
plan when they can anticipate that the interlocutor’s turn
is about to end? If utterance planning and listening indeed
co-occur in time, how do speakers distribute their process-
ing resources across these tasks? And how do concurrent
listening and speech planning affect each other? Address-
ing these and related questions is crucial for understanding
how we speak and comprehend speech in everyday con-
texts. So far, however, most experimental psycholinguistic
work has concerned monologues and little is known about
the way listening and speech planning are coordinated in
everyday conversations. In the present study, we devel-
oped a new paradigm to assess the coordination of
speaking and listening in a simple turn-taking task.
The basic idea underlying the study was that initiating
speech planning whilst listening to another person should
increase the mental load for the speaker, and that this
increase in mental load should lead to a performance
decrement in a motor task carried out concurrently with
the linguistic task. With this approach we built upon
results of numerous dual-task experiments showing that
performance in a cognitively demanding task deteriorates
when it is carried out simultaneously with another cogni-
tively demanding task rather than by itself (Baddeley,
1976; Becic et al., 2010; Bock, Dell, Garnsey, Kramer, &
Kubose, 2007; Duncan, 1980; Kemper, Herman, & Lian,
2003; Kemper, Schmalzried, Herman, & Mohankumar,
2011; Lavie, 2005; Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding,
2004; Meyer & Kieras, 1997; Pashler, 1984, 1994). There
are various accounts of dual-task interference but most
of them share the assumption that there is a limit to the
overall amount of cognitive resources that can be attrib-
uted to concurrent cognitive tasks (Duncan, 1980;
Kahneman, 1973; Marois & Ivanoff, 2005; Watanabe &
Funahashi, 2014; Wickens, 1980). When capacity needs
to be distributed across two tasks (rather than being exclu-
sively dedicated to one task) performance in one or both
tasks suffers (Somberg & Salthouse, 1982). Related
accounts assume that dual-task interference arises because
of limitations to central executive control or monitoring
processes (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; D’Esposito et al.,
1995). In addition to these domain-general sources of
interference, there may be interference in speciﬁc processingcomponents, such as verbal working memory, visual
processing, or motor planning, drawn upon by both tasks
(Bergen, Medeiros-Ward, Wheeler, Drews, & Strayer,
2013; Pashler, 1994).
Most relevant to the current study are dual-task studies
that have shown that speaking and listening are prone to
dual-task interference. Much of this work concerned the
way listening and speaking (for instance using a mobile
phone) can be combined with driving and therefore has
used braking, following, or lane-keeping tasks (Becic
et al., 2010; Horrey & Wickens, 2006; Kubose et al., 2006;
Kunar, Carter, Cohen, & Horowitz, 2008; Strayer, Drews,
& Johnston, 2003; Strayer & Johnston, 2001). Other studies
were carried out in the context of research on aging and
combined linguistic tasks with motor tasks such as walk-
ing, ﬁnger tapping, or tracking a moving target on a com-
puter screen (Kemper, Herman, & Nartowicz, 2005;
Kemper et al., 2003). These lines of research have yielded
abundant evidence for dual-task interference between
speaking or listening and concurrent non-linguistic tasks.
This demonstrates that non-negligible amounts of process-
ing capacity are required for talking and listening (for
corroborating evidence from studies using other paradigm
see, for instance, (Caplan & Waters, 2013; Cleland,
Tamminen, Quinlan, & Gaskell, 2012; Cook & Meyer,
2008; Ferreira & Pashler, 2002; Gordon, Eberhardt, &
Rueckl, 1993; Mattys, Brooks, & Cooke, 2009; Papesh &
Goldinger, 2012; Roelofs & Piai, 2011). Moreover, these
studies have demonstrated that dual-task paradigms are
suitable to measure differences in the capacity demands
imposed by different linguistic tasks. A common (though
not universal) ﬁnding is, for instance, that speaking
interferes more with secondary task performance, and
hence appear to require more capacity, than listening
(Almor, 2008; Kubose et al., 2006; Kunar et al., 2008;
Recarte & Nunes, 2003) but see (Kubose et al., 2006).
Recently Boiteau, Malone, Peters, and Almor (2014)
used a dual-task paradigm to investigate the cognitive
demands in turn-taking situations. In their study, partici-
pants’ primary task was to engage in an unscripted
15-min conversation with a confederate (Experiment 1)
or a friend (Experiment 2). The secondary task was a con-
tinuous visuomotor task, which consisted of tracking a
moving target on a computer screen using the computer
mouse. The tracking task was carried out by itself (control
condition) and throughout the conversation. The authors
recorded the participants’ speech rate and ﬂuency in the
conversation and their performance in the tracking task,
measured as the distance between the target and the cur-
sor. Speciﬁcally, they examined the tracking performance
in the tracking-only control condition and in 480-ms time
windows at the beginning and at the end of utterances the
participants heard or produced, and at the ends of pauses
preceding or following the participants’ utterance onsets.
Boiteau and colleagues found that the participants’ perfor-
mance in the tracking task deteriorated in the conversation
compared to the control condition. In addition they found
that overall the participants’ tracking performance was
better during listening than during speaking or during
the planning pauses preceding their utterances. Further
analyses showed that the participants’ tracking performance
Fig. 1. Example display.
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interlocutor’s utterances (i.e., when the participants were
listening), but deteriorated across the time windows at
the end of the interlocutor’s utterances, in the planning
pause and at the beginning of the participants’ utterance.
These results indicate that, compared to listening and
articulating speech, speech planning is particularly high
in capacity demands. This conclusion is consistent with
earlier observations concerning the distributions of pauses
and speech disﬂuencies in spontaneous speech, which tend
to precede major planning units (Garrett, 1982; Grosjean,
Grosjean, & Lane, 1979; Levelt, 1993). It is also consistent
with experimental evidence from a variety of paradigms
demonstrating that the early processes involved in
utterance planning – identifying the concepts to be spoken
about and selecting the corresponding lexical items –
require central processing capacity (Belke, 2008; Cook &
Meyer, 2008; Crowther & Martin, 2014; Roelofs & Piai,
2011; Shao, Roelofs, & Meyer, 2012; Wagner, Jescheniak,
& Schriefers, 2010).
For the present purposes, the most important ﬁnding of
Boiteau and colleagues is that the participants began to
plan their utterance while they were still listening to the
interlocutor. This is in line with the observation mentioned
above that inter-turn-intervals in conversations are often
so short that speakers must have begun to plan their utter-
ance before the end of the preceding turn. Similar ﬁndings
to those obtained by Boiteau and colleagues were reported
by Ford and Holmes (1978), who asked participants to talk
freely about various topics while categorising tones that
were played at irregular intervals. Ford and Holmes found
that the participants’ responses to the tones were slower
when the tones were played towards the end than at the
beginning of clauses. They attributed the slow reactions
to the processing load arising from planning the upcoming
clause. Note, however, that Ford and Holmes’s study con-
cerned monologues and does not directly speak to the
question of how speakers time their utterance planning
in dialogue.
In the study by Boiteau and colleagues, the participants
were engaged in unscripted 15-min dialogues about vari-
ous topics. As the authors point out, studying spontaneous
speech is invaluable for our understanding of how interloc-
utors allocate their processing resources in everyday con-
versations. However, researchers might sometimes wish
to have tighter control of the content of the interlocutors’
utterances. Though inter-turn intervals in natural conver-
sations are typically short (around 200 ms), there is con-
siderable variation around the average interval (Heldner
& Edlund, 2010). This is not surprising. It is easy to think
of many variables that may affect when speakers begin
to plan their utterance and how long the planning pro-
cesses leading to the initiation of the utterance take. For
example, speakers ﬁrst need to understand the interlocu-
tor’s speech act (whether it is, for instance, a question or
request), they need to think of an appropriate reply, and,
depending on the perceived time pressure, they might
want to plan it fully or partially before beginning to speak.
Many authors have stressed that speech planning is ﬂexi-
ble (Swets, Jacovina, & Gerrig, 2013; van de Velde, Meyer,
& Konopka, 2014), and this undoubtedly holds not onlyfor the speakers’ planning units and their choice of words
and sentence structures, but also for the timing of their
utterance planning.
Yet, the fact that speakers have some ﬂexibility in their
utterance planning does not mean that utterance planning
is entirely unconstrained. A challenging task for psycholin-
guistic research of dialogue is to identify the variables that
limit the speakers’ allocation of processing resources and
determine the possible planning strategies. Much of this
research can be done by analysing large corpora of sponta-
neous utterances and extract the relevant variables in the
way pioneered by Boiteau and colleagues. An alternative
approach is to constrain the participants’ utterances in
certain ways and to observe which planning strategies they
use. These approaches are complimentary to each other
and should yield converging evidence about the way
interlocutors manage dialogue. Here we describe a dual-
task paradigm where the content of the interlocutors’
utterances and, importantly, the presentation of the infor-
mation that the speakers needed to prepare their utterance
was tightly controlled by using a picture description task.
As explained in more detail below, we used this paradigm
to test two hypotheses about the onset of speech planning
in this task.
To measure dual-task performance, we used a complex
ﬁnger-tapping task (Kemper et al., 2003, see also Fraser, Li,
& Penhune, 2010; Seth-Smith, Ashton, & McFarland, 1989).
We used ﬁnger tapping because the use of pictorial mate-
rials in the linguistic tasks precluded the use of a visual
tracking task as a secondary task. Tapping performance
has been shown to decline under dual-task demands
(Fraser et al., 2010; Hiscock, Cheesman, Inch, Chipuer, &
Graff, 1989), indicating that tapping requires the allocation
of cognitive resources. In addition, inﬂuences of a verbal
task on tapping have been reported as an increase in the
deviation from a ﬁxed tapping rate when a story was retold
aloud but also during passive listening (Seth-Smith et al.,
1989). Continuous complex tapping does not require
attention to exogenous stimuli (Theeuwes, 1991), but can
be generated endogenously once the participants have
learned the tapping pattern.
We used the following procedure: On each trial of the
experiment, participants saw a display featuring two rows
of pictures, with each row containing two pairs of pictures
separated by an arrow (see Fig. 1). The arrow between the
two objects of a pair indicated whether the array should be
described as ‘‘put the X above the Y’’ or ‘‘put the X below
the Y’’. At trial onset, one row, selected at random, was
described by a pre-recorded speaker (speaker 1). Because
all pictures on the screen were different, participants knew
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which rowwas described ﬁrst and which row would be left
to be described second. There were three conditions differ-
ing in the participants’ task: In the Tapping and Speaking
task, participants listened to speaker 1 and then described
the remaining pairs in the same fashion, saying for
instance, Put the tree under the butterﬂy and put the candle
above the wall. Four seconds after the offset of the utter-
ance of speaker 1 a stop signal (a tone and a red dot) was
presented and the pictures disappeared. Participants were
instructed to complete their utterance before the stop
signal. Thus, they were encouraged to respond relatively
fast, as one might do in normal dialogue. Subsequently,
they had to indicate whether they thought their utterance
had been correct and whether they had completed it before
the tone. They did this by reading aloud the word ‘‘goed’’
(correct) or ‘‘fout’’ (wrong), which appeared on the screen
after the stop signal. Throughout the entire experiment,
the participants continuously tapped a complex pattern
(index ﬁnger, ring ﬁnger, middle ﬁnger, little ﬁnger). We
measured their speech onset latencies, the durations of
the spoken words, and their performance in the tapping
task (the number of correct taps per second).
The second task, Tapping and Listening, involved a sim-
ilar sequence of events. Again, participants ﬁrst heard an
utterance referring to the objects in the top or bottom
row of the display, chosen at random. However, instead
of describing the remaining pictures themselves, they then
listened to a second pre-recorded speaker (speaker 2)
doing so. Subsequently, they indicated by reading aloud
the word ‘‘goed’’ or ‘‘fout’’ whether the second speaker’s
utterance was correct and completed before the stop
signal. In other words, the participants overheard a pair
of turns and evaluated the second speaker. Finally, in the
Speaking Only task, participants performed the same tasks
as in the Tapping and Speaking task but without tapping.
The judgement task at the end of the trial was introduced
to make sure that the participants in the Tapping and
Listening task paid attention to the second speaker. In
order to render the trial structure in all tasks as similar
as possible, the self-monitoring task was included in the
speaking conditions.
We expected that the participants’ tapping performance
might decline as soon as the utterance of speaker 1 began.
More importantly, in the Tapping and Speaking task, we
expected a further decline in tapping performance relative
to the Tapping and Listening task as soon as the partici-
pants began to plan their utterance. Concerning the timing
of this decline we contrasted two hypotheses: That speak-
ers begin to plan their utterance as soon as they have suf-
ﬁcient information to do so (the Early Hypothesis), or that
they wait until the end of the interlocutor’s turn (the Late
Hypothesis). Both planning strategies could easily be
applied in our task: As soon as speaker 1 had named the
ﬁrst object, the participants knew which row of objects
they should describe themselves and could initiate their
own speech planning (as per the Early Hypothesis); how-
ever, since there was only moderate time pressure to
respond, they could also wait until speaker 1 had named
the last object and then begin to plan their utterance (as
per the Late Hypothesis). Based on the earlier evidenceconcerning short inter-turn intervals one might expect that
speakers would initiate their speech planning early. By
contrast, the results obtained by Boiteau and colleagues
suggest that speech planning might begin late, around
the offset of the preceding utterance.
In addition to the tapping performance, we compared
the participants’ speech onset latencies and noun dura-
tions in the Tapping and Speaking task and in the Speaking
Only task. This was done to assess to what extent the tap-
ping task altered the way the participants planned and
produced their utterances. One might expect some inter-
ference between tapping and speaking to arise at the level
of motor execution (Bodwell, Mahurin, Waddle, Price, &
Cramer, 2003). This would complicate the interpretation
of any dual-task interference effects. Mutual interference
at a level of motor execution would be expected to
inﬂuence articulation as well as tapping. By measuring
the noun durations we could assess the extent of motor
interference in this task.
In sum, the current project investigated dual-task
interference in speaking and listening using a continuous
secondary task, complex tapping. Performance in the tap-
ping task at different moments in time should indicate
when participants engage in the central-capacity demand-
ing components of speech planning. We created a situation
that allowed participants to plan their utterances early. If
they start to prepare their turn as soon as they know what
to say, interference should begin to arise early during their
interlocutor’s turn, around the offset of the ﬁrst noun of the
ﬁrst speaker, following the Early Hypothesis. Alternatively,
if they wait until the end of their interlocutor’s speech,
interference should only arise around the offset of their
interlocutor’s speech, following the Late Hypothesis. In
addition, follow-up analyses, involving a moving analysis
window, allowed us to get a more precise estimate of the
onset of speech planning.
Two experiments were conducted using the paradigm
describedhere. Theydiffered in the amountof tapping train-
ing the participants received before the experiment. In
Experiment 1, the participants’ speech and tapping perfor-
mance were recorded. In Experiment 2, their eye move-
ments were registered as well. As will be explained below,
this allowed us to track the participants’ allocation of visual
attention and provided additional information about the
initiation of speech planning and about the usefulness of




Thirty-eight participants (six men) from the Max Planck
Institute participant pool were tested. They were univer-
sity students with a mean age of 22 years. The data
obtained from four participants were discarded because
they either failed to tap during the initial 3 s of a trial, or
failed to name the pictures correctly on more than 75% of
the speaking trials. All participants indicated that they
were right-handed. They received a small ﬁnancial reward
for their participation. The instructions stressed that the
308 M.J. Sjerps, A.S. Meyer / Cognition 136 (2015) 304–324participants should feel free to ask any questions they
might have and that they could leave the experiment at
any time. Ethical approval for the study had been given
by the Ethics Board of the Faculty of Social Sciences of
the Radboud University Nijmegen.
2.1.2. Apparatus
The experiment was controlled by a desktop computer
with Presentation software (Neurobehavioral systems).
Finger tapping was recorded by means of a purpose-built
four-button box attached to the computer. The buttons
consisted of microphones that required very little pressure
to record a response. The participants’ speech was
recorded using a Sennheiser ME 64 microphone capsule.
Auditory stimuli were presented using Sennheiser HD
280-13 headphones. Praat software (Boersma & Weenink,
2009) was used to generate the auditory stimuli and mea-
sure the duration of the participants’ utterances. Stimuli
were recorded at a sample rate of 44,100 Hz.
2.1.3. Materials
2.1.3.1. Visual stimuli. Forty pictures were selected from the
database of 590 single-object line-drawings generated by
Severens, Van Lommel, Ratinckx, and Hartsuiker (2005).
The data base provides norms for these pictures in Belgian
Dutch. Pictures were selected according to the following
criteria applied in the order listed here: The picture name
was monosyllabic or disyllabic; the average log picture
naming latency was within 1.5 Standard deviations (SD)
of the mean latency for the pictures in the data base; the
frequency of the picture name was within 1.5 SD of the
mean log frequency; the picture name was mono-
morphemic.
Using these pictures, ﬁve practice items and 90 experi-
mental items were created. Each item featured eight
semantically unrelated objects, randomly arranged in four
pairs on two rows (see Fig. 1 for an example and Appendi-
ces A and B for a listing of all items, along with average
length and frequency of the items per position as items
were not counterbalanced on position). Each picture
appeared 18 times on experimental trials (six times per
condition) and three times on practice trials (once per
condition).
In each row, arrows pointing up or down appeared
between the ﬁrst and second object and between the third
and fourth object. Each display featured two arrows of
each type, assigned randomly to the four positions. The
line drawings were sized to have a maximal length and
width of 7 cm, corresponding to a visual angle of approxi-
mately 6.5 deg for the participant. The length of the arrow
was 4.5 cm, corresponding to approximately 4 deg.
2.1.3.2. Auditory stimuli. The auditory stimuli were created
in two steps. First, a female speaker of Dutch (speaker 1)
described both rows of each of the 95 displays, saying,
for instance, Zet de boom onder de vlinder en zet de kaars
boven de muur (Put the tree under the butterﬂy and put the
candle above the wall). First, she described all items in the
top rows of the displays and then all items in the bottom
rows. Across all 95 picture arrays, a random selection of
48 top and 47 bottom descriptions was used as speaker 1utterances for the experiment. The descriptions lasted
between 2.67 s and 3.72 s, with an average of 3.02 s.
To create the recordings of speaker 2 (to be used in the
Tapping and Listening task), a male speaker of Dutch was
recorded while he was performing the Tapping and Speak-
ing Task in the same way as the participants in the exper-
iments. He ﬁrst practiced the tapping task and was
familiarised with the pictures. Then he saw each of the dis-
plays, heard the description of speaker 1 and described the
remaining object pairs. Four seconds after speaker 1 offset
a tone was presented and a dot appeared on the screen.
The speaker aimed to complete his description before this
audio-visual stop signal appeared. Subsequently, he indi-
cated whether or not his description was correct by saying
either ‘‘goed’’ (correct) or ‘‘fout’’ (incorrect). He carried out
the tapping task during the entire recording session. Most
of the 90 experimental utterances were correct and ﬂuent.
On ﬁve trials the speaker used a wrong noun to describe a
picture (e.g., ‘‘vlinder’’ (butterﬂy) instead of ‘‘ﬂes’’ (bottle))
and on 15 trials he completed the utterance too late (initi-
ating the fourth object name later than 150 ms before the
onset of the stop signal). This amounts to an error rate of
22%. The utterances of speaker 2 were spliced out from
onset to offset. Their average duration was 3.7 s (with a
minimum of 2.7 s and a maximum of 5.5 s).
In the Tapping and Speaking task and in the Speaking
Only task the participants only heard the utterances by
speaker 1. In the Tapping and Listening task, they heard
speaker 1 followed after 250 ms by speaker 2. This inter-
turn interval was our estimate of a likely inter-turn inter-
val in this task. It was slightly longer than the 200 ms
obtained by Stivers et al. (2009) because the utterances
produced by the participants were more complex than
simple yes/no answers. Speaker 2 sentences were trun-
cated at 4 s after speaker 1 offset, that is, the stop signal
was played instead of the end of the sentence. 45% of the
utterances of speaker 2 were truncated, but typically only
by one phoneme.
2.1.4. Design
There were three experimental conditions tested within
participants: Tapping and Speaking, Tapping and Listening,
and Speaking Only. Each task was tested in a separate
block. The order of the blocks was counterbalanced across
participants. The 90 experimental items were randomly
assigned to three sets of 30 items each, and the assignment
of sets to conditions was counterbalanced across partici-
pants. The experimental items within blocks were pre-
sented in a random order. Each block began with ﬁve
practice items. In total, eighteen experimental lists were
created (six presentation orders of conditions crossed with
three assignments of conditions to sets of pictures). 16 lists
were seen by two participants and two lists were only seen
by one participant each.
2.1.5. Procedure
In the experimental session, the participants were ﬁrst
asked to study a booklet showing the line drawings that
were used in the experiment along with the object names.
They were instructed to use these names in the description
task.
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selves with the button box and the tapping sequence.
Declines in tapping performance under load have been
reported to be greater for the dominant than the non-dom-
inant hand (Simon & Sussman, 1987). Furthermore, effects
of concurrent talking have been shown to be stronger for
complex ﬁnger tapping sequences than for simple tapping
(Kemper et al., 2003). Therefore, we asked the right-
handed participants to tap a complex pattern of (1 (index
ﬁnger), 3 (ring ﬁnger), 2 (middle ﬁnger), 4 (little ﬁnger))
with their dominant hand. The training was terminated
as soon as the participant had performed 50 consecutive
correct taps. Training times varied across participants
between 2 and 10 min.
Next, participants were asked to complete an extended
version of the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldﬁeld,
1971) to conﬁrm their right-handedness. Then they
received another booklet showing the 40 pictures, now
without their names, and were asked to name them.
Naming errors were immediately corrected by the
experimenter.
Then the participants were instructed for the ﬁrst block
of the main experiment. The instructions depended on the
task. Additional instructions were given prior to each
block. For the Tapping and Listening task participants were
instructed to listen to the descriptions by speaker 1 and 2
and then to indicate whether speaker 2 had described the
displays correctly and had completed the utterance on
time (before the stop signal). They did so by saying aloud
‘‘goed’’ (correct) or ‘‘fout’’ (incorrect). The participants
were encouraged to tap the sequence they had practiced
as fast and accurately as possible throughout the test
block, but they were told that the linguistic task was more
important than the tapping task.
In the Tapping and Speaking task, the participants were
instructed to listen to speaker 1, and then to describe the
two remaining object pairs. They were asked to try to com-
plete the utterance before the stop signal was presented.
They should then indicate whether they thought they
had described the display correctly and completed the
description on time by saying ‘‘goed’’ or ‘‘fout’’. Again, they
were asked to tap as fast and accurately as possible
throughout the test block, but to give priority to the lin-
guistic task. Finally, in the Speaking Only task participants
were instructed to listen to speaker 1, describe the remain-
ing object pairs and again judge the correctness and timing
of their own utterance.
Fig. 2 shows the trial structure. In all tasks, each trial
began with a blank interval of two seconds, followed by a
one-second preview of the eight-object display. Then, the





Fig. 2. Schematic representation of thduration of 3.02 s) was played while the display remained
in view. In the Tapping and Listening task, the pre-
recorded utterance of speaker 2 followed 250 ms after
the offset of speaker 1. Four seconds after the offset of
the utterance of speaker 1 a tone (with a duration of 1 s
and a frequency of 400 Hz) was played and the pictures
disappeared and were replaced by a red dot in the centre
of the screen. After the offset of the sound and dot, the
words ‘‘goed’’ (correct) and ‘‘fout’’ (incorrect) appeared
next to each other on the screen. The participant read
aloud one of them to indicate whether or not the utterance
by speaker 2 was correct. The words disappeared after
2.5 s, and the next trial began.
The trial structure in the Tapping and Speaking and
Speaking Only tasks was the same, except that the partic-
ipant heard the description by speaker 1, then described
the remaining pictures themselves, and ﬁnally evaluated
the correctness of their own utterance.
As explained in the Introduction, the stop signal was
introduced to make sure that the participants in the Tap-
ping and Speaking and in the Speaking Only tasks tried
to respond promptly. The judgement task was included
to make sure that participants paid attention to the spoken
materials in the Tapping and Listening task. To keep
the procedure as similar as possible across conditions,
the self-monitoring task was included in the speaking
conditions.
2.1.6. Analysis approach for tapping performance
For the tapping analyses, all data were used, including
those with naming errors. This ensured that an equal num-
ber of trials contributed to the three tasks. Because of the
high sensitivity of the microphone-buttons, on some occa-
sions button presses as well as button releases activated
the button-response trigger. Therefore, all instances where
the same button-trigger was activated twice within
400 ms were discarded (26% of the taps). Based on the
remaining data, a button-press was labelled as correct if
it followed the correct predecessor. For instance, as the
pattern was 1-3-2-4, the predecessor for button 3 had to
be 1, and for button 1 it had to be 4. The ﬁrst tap in a block
was always coded as correct. 11% of the valid taps were
discarded because they were incorrect. Tapping rate
was calculated as the number of correct taps placed per
second in a particular time window. Thus, tapping rate
was an aggregated score, combining tapping speed and
correctness.
Tapping rates were modelled spanning from 5 s before
the end of the turn of speaker 1 until 4 s after the turn of
speaker 1 (i.e., the end of the speaker 2 response window).
Analyses were carried out by comparing the quality of ﬁtSpeaker 2/silence Beep
Correct/wrongDotne
e sequence of events in a trial.
1 Readers may be concerned that our decision to display the tapping
scores aligned to Speaker 1 offset does not allow for a fair visual inspection
of the Early Planning Hypothesis. Note, however, that alignment to noun 4
offset could not obscure substantive interference aligned to the offset of
noun 1 because up to noun 4 the lines representing the tapping scores in
the two conditions are virtually on top of each other. In the bottom panel of
Fig. 3, where predictors are also aligned to speaker 1 offset, the hypoth-
esised increase in cognitive demands is indeed clearly distinguishable.
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lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2013) in R
(R_Core_Team, 2013). To assess whether planning was
initiated early or late in the Tapping and Speaking task four
predictor variables were constructed. These variables
either had the value 1 or 0, depending on the assumed time
course of interference between speech planning and
tapping (see bottom panel of Fig. 3).
The main hypotheses were the Early versus Late Plan-
ning hypotheses. For the Early Planning predictor the value
was initially 0 and set to 1 from the offset of the ﬁrst noun
of speaker 1 (i.e., this variable was tailored to the speech
times of each individual trial). For the Late Planning predic-
tor the value was initially also 0 but was only set to 1 start-
ing from the offset of the fourth noun of speaker 1. We did
not know whether interference would decrease again after
the initial planning phase. Conceivably, not only planning
object names, but also maintaining an utterance plan in
working memory and monitoring the correctness of the
utterance may be capacity-demanding. Therefore, two
predictors each were created for the Early and the Late
Hypotheses. For the Temporary predictors, we assumed a
planning time of 600 ms per word, following averages
reported in the literature (Indefrey & Levelt, 2004;
Strijkers & Costa, 2011). This resulted in a 2.4 s (4 * 600)
windowwhere the predictor value was 1 instead of 0. After
this period the predictor was set back to 0. The Continuous
predictors had the same onset rise times as their Tempo-
rary counterparts but their value did not return to 0 for
the rest of the analysis window. A ﬁnal model was included
that did not include any Planning predictor (i.e., a base
model) to assess whether the inclusion of the Planning
models was warranted at all.
Linear mixed-effects regression (Lmer) models of the
tapping data with the four different predictors were cre-
ated and compared to each other based on AICc (Aikaike
Information Criterion corrected) measures of model ﬁt.
We report the ﬁtted values for all models that received
Delta AICc values below 2. All models were ﬁt with the
Maximum Likelihood method for ﬁtting (i.e., with
REML set to FALSE in lmer modelling). The models were
subsequently compared by assessing their AICc values
with the aictab() function from the AICcmodavg package
(Mazerolle, 2013) implemented in R. As these models are
nonnested, a comparison of v2 values (using, for example,
the anova() function) is not valid. This approach applies to
all analyses reported below.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Tapping data
The top panel of Fig. 3 displays the tapping rates, aggre-
gated into 19 500-ms-bins, aligned to the offset of speaker
1 (i.e., focussing on the turn-taking point, indicated by the
vertical line in the ﬁgure). To exemplify, the bin at time 1 s
encompasses observations between 0.75 and 1.25 s after
the offset of speaker 1. The ﬁgure provides an indication
of the development of dual-task interference on tapping
rates across the trial. Each time point represents the aver-
age tapping rate in the Tapping and Speaking (ﬁlled
squares) or the Tapping and Listening (open diamonds)task. At the top part, the vertical lines are indications of
the maximal and minimal durations of the speaker 1 part
(which varied in duration due to differences in word
lengths). It can be observed that tapping rates were quite
similar until shortly before speaker 1 offset, when a sudden
decrease in tapping rates was observed in the Tapping and
Speaking task. Tapping rates increased again around 2 s
into the speaker 2 phase, which was, on average, around
the time of the initiation of the third noun. During the
judgement phase, tapping rates in the Tapping and
Speaking task recovered, and were in fact better than in
the Tapping and Listening task.1
A ﬁrst analysis included the factors Task (with the levels
Tapping and Speaking and Tapping and Listening, with the
latter modelled on the intercept); Block (with the values
1, 0, and 1, for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd block, respectively);
and the Planning predictors, varying between 0 and 1
depending on the assumed alignment and duration of
interference. An average value of the predictor was calcu-
lated for each 0.5 s window as for the tapping rates. The
models included the main ﬁxed effect for Block, the main
ﬁxed effects for Task, and the interaction term between
Task and the Planning predictors. In addition, the models
contained random effects for those interactions for sub-
jects and items thereby assuming a maximal random
structure for the critical interaction test (Barr, 2013). This
approach takes into account that participants may differ
in baseline tapping rates and in the strength of the effect
of speech planning on their tapping performance.
The top part of Table 1 presents the results. It can be
observed that the model assuming continuous interference
from the offset of the fourth (last) noun of speaker 1 ﬁtted
the data best. The optimal model revealed a signiﬁcant
effect on the Intercept (B = 2.891, SE = 0.094, p < 0.001),
reﬂecting an average tapping rate of about 2.9 taps per sec-
ond for the Tapping and Listening task during the speaker 1
part. Non-signiﬁcant values were observed for the main
effect of Task (B = 0.028, SE = 0.071, p = 0.700), suggesting
that before the offset of noun 4 of speaker 1 there was no
signiﬁcant difference in tapping rate between the two
tasks. A signiﬁcant main effect was observed for Block
(B = 0.196, SE = 0.045, p < 0.001) as participants’ overall
tapping rates increased as the experiment progressed. A
signiﬁcant effect was observed for the Planning predictor
(B = 0.151, SE = 0.053, p = 0.004), indicating that a
decrease in tapping performance occurred for the Tapping
and Listening task after the offset of the ﬁrst speaker. This
may be related to the fact that the participants were asked
to monitor the correctness of the utterances of speaker 2,
but not of speaker 1. More importantly, a signiﬁcant inter-
action was observed between Task and the Planning pre-
dictor (B = 0.399, SE = 0.077, p < 0.001). This shows that
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Fig. 3. Top panel: Average tapping rates across trials in Experiment 1, aligned to the offset of speaker 1. Error bars reﬂect the standard error of the by-
participants mean. Bottom panel: Average predictor values for the analyses. Averages are displayed because the predictors were aligned to noun offsets and
were therefore trial-speciﬁc.
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speaker’s turn than in the Tapping and Listening task.
These results are in line with the Late Planning Hypothesis.
Participants seem to have initiated their planning close to
the end of the ﬁrst speaker’s turn. There was no evidence
for a substantial decrease of interference after the initial
planning phase.
In a second analysis we investigated the timing of inter-
ference around the time of the speaker switch in moredetail. In this analysis we only included data points that
were within 2 s of the end of the utterance of speaker 1.
Four continuous models were created that were aligned
differently to the offset of the ﬁrst speaker’s turn. The ﬁrst
model assumed a planning delay of 0.5 s, the second
assumed no delay, and the third and fourth model assumed
that planning preceded the offset of speaker 1 by 0.5 s
and by 1 s, respectively. The bottom part of Table 1 reports
the results. The optimal model assumed an increase in
Table 1
Model selection values for models that differ with respect to the temporal
shape of the planning predictor. ‘‘Base’’ refers to the model without the
planning predictor.
Predictor K W Delta_AICc
Analysis 1: Planning across the trial
N4_Continuous 26 1 0 (AICc = 125282.7)
N1_Continuous 26 0 238.48
N4_Temporary 26 0 414.92
N1_Temporary 26 0 971.28
Base 10 0 1042.87
Analysis 2: Alignment of planning to speaker 1 offset
0.5 26 1 0 (AICc = 65961.77)
0 26 0 15.89
1.0 26 0 78.83
+0.5 26 0 88.52
Note. K refers to the number of free parameters. W reﬂects the relative
weight of evidence for the model among the compared models. Del-
ta_AICc reﬂects the information loss relative to the best model (which has
a value of 0). Models are ordered based on Delta_AICc. Models having a
difference in AICc < 2 compared to the model with the smallest AICc value
have substantial support (evidence), those with 4 < i < 7 have consider-
ably less support, and models having i > 10 have essentially no support,
see Burnham and Anderson (2004).
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er’s turn. None of the other models received substantial
support compared to this model. The optimal model had
a signiﬁcant value for the Intercept (B = 2.845, SE = 0.104,
p < 0.001). No main effect was observed for the Planning
predictor (B = 0.063, SE = 0.039, p = 0.107). No main effect
was observed for Task (B = 0.002, SE = 0.070, p = 0.976). A
signiﬁcant main effect was observed for Block (B = 0.191,
SE = 0.044, p < 0.001). A signiﬁcant interaction was
observed between Task and the Planning predictor
(B = 0.462, SE = 0.077, p < 0.001). These results closely
match those of the ﬁrst analysis, with the exception that
the main effect of Planning predictor was no longer signif-
icant in the smaller analysis window. This suggests that
the decline in performance after speaker 1 offset in the
Tapping and Listening task was especially strong towards
the end of the speaker 2 part, i.e. the section that was



















Fig. 4. Results of Experiment 1: Average noun durations (in seconds) for
the four nouns for the Tapping and Speaking and the Speaking Only tasks.
Error bars reﬂect the standard errors of the by-participant means.2.2.2. Speech production data
Utterances that contained missing or incorrect object
names and utterances where the last noun was not initi-
ated at least 150 ms before the stop signal were coded as
errors. The average error rates in the Tapping and Speaking
and in the Speaking Only task were 17% and 8%, respec-
tively (The pre-recorded Speaker 2 had an error rate of
22%, i.e., similar to that in the Tapping and Speaking task).
These errors were excluded from the following analy-
ses, as were utterances with onset latencies outside of
the range of 2.5 standard deviations from the grand mean
(2.5% of the data). The average speech onset latencies for
the remaining utterances were 452 ms (SE = 27 ms across
participants) in the Tapping and Speaking Task and
372 ms (SE = 25 ms across participants) in the Speaking
Only Task, respectively. This difference was tested with a
model including a ﬁxed effect for Task (with the levelsTapping and Speaking and Speaking Only; where the latter
served as the reference level), and random slopes for
participants and items on Task. The analysis revealed a
signiﬁcant intercept (B = 0.373, SE = 0.026, p < 0.001),
indicating the occurrence of a reliable pause between
turns. In addition, an effect of Task was observed
(B = 0.078, SE = 0.025, p = 0.002), which shows that the
gap between turns was signiﬁcantly larger in the Tapping
and Speaking than in the Speaking Only task.
Fig. 4 displays the average noun durations for each of
the four positions in each speaking task. As can be seen
the nouns were longer in the second and fourth than
in the ﬁrst and third position, and the durations in the
two tasks were very similar. For the analysis of noun dura-
tions the model contained the ﬁxed effects Task and Noun
(with the levels Noun 1, Noun 2, Noun 3, Noun 4). Random
slopes were included for the two main effects for both par-
ticipants and items (the inclusion of interaction terms led
to a failure to converge). A signiﬁcant effect was observed
for the Intercept (B = 0.312, SE = 0.008, p < 0.001), where
the B value reﬂects the average duration for nouns in the
Speaking Only task for nouns in the ﬁrst position. No sig-
niﬁcant effect was observed for Task (B = 0.002,
SE = 0.003, p = 0.543) as noun durations in the ﬁrst position
did not differ signiﬁcantly across the two tasks. Signiﬁcant
effect were observed for each of the three positions (Noun
2: B = 0.047, SE = 0.010, p < 0.001; Noun 3: B = 0.029,
SE = 0.010, p = 0.003; Noun 4: B = 0.100, SE = 0.013,
p < 0.001) reﬂecting the fact that nouns in second, third
and fourth position were longer in duration than those in
ﬁrst. No signiﬁcant interaction effects were observed
between Task and Noun for nouns in second and third
position (Noun 2: B 0.0002, SE = 0.003, p = 0.942; Noun 3:
B = 0.002, SE = 0.003, p = 0.518), which shows that nouns
in these positions did not differ in length depending on the
task. A signiﬁcant interaction was observed between Task
and Noun for the fourth position (B = 0.010, SE = 0.003,
p = 0.001), reﬂecting the fact that in the fourth position
nouns were uttered more slowly in the Tapping and Speak-
ing than in the Speaking Only task. Note though, that this
difference in noun durations was less than 10 ms.
The average durations of the sentences (onset of noun 1
to offset of noun 4) in the two speaking tasks were almost
M.J. Sjerps, A.S. Meyer / Cognition 136 (2015) 304–324 313identical (3.04 s and 3.02 s for the Tapping and Speaking
and the Speaking only tasks, respectively). This is reﬂected
in the analyses with only a signiﬁcant effect for the Inter-
cept (B = 3.017, SE = 0.031, p < 0.001), but not for Task
(B = 0.024, SE = 0.022, p = 0.279).
2.2.3. Judgement task
On 2% of the trials no judgement response was given.
On the remaining trials, participants almost always (on
more than 94% of the trials in all tasks) indicated that cor-
rect utterances were correct. Incorrect utterances were
identiﬁed as such on 70% of the trials in the Tapping and
Speaking task, and on 60% of the trials in Tapping and Lis-
tening and the Speaking only task.
2.3. Discussion
The analyses showed that in the Tapping and Listening
condition, tapping performance slightly deteriorated after
the change of speaker (and especially at the end of the
speaker 2 part). This effect is most likely a result of the
monitoring task because during the Speaker 1 part, to
which no monitoring task applied, no such decline was
visible. Substantially more interference arose when the
participants described the pictures themselves in the
Tapping and Speaking task. This result is compatible with
the intuition that speaking is harder than listening, and is
in line with a number of previous reports (Almor, 2008;
Boiteau et al., 2014; Recarte & Nunes, 2003). However, it
is in contrast to the results of Kubose et al. (2006), who
found that speaking and listening had very similar effects
on performance in a secondary driving task. One reason
for this difference in outcomes may be that the tasks used
by Kubose et al. (2006) relied heavily on memory retrieval
processes, as both the production and comprehension
task involved creating mental maps of the positions of
different buildings on the participants’ campus. Memory
retrieval processes, which involve strong dual-task costs
(Naveh-Benjamin, Craik, Perretta, & Tonev, 2000), may
have obscured potential differences between the compre-
hension and production tasks. Future research should
address this issue further.
The top panel of Fig. 3 shows that the tapping rates in
the Tapping and Speaking task were lowest about
2000 ms after speaker 1 offset, around the time that the
participants were planning the third object name. This
observation is surprising because earlier evidence suggests
that the cognitive load for speakers is highest at utterance
onset (Kemper et al., 2011). In our study, the speakers pro-
duced two clauses (‘‘Put the A above the B and put the C
above the D’’) on each trial, and they may have treated each
of them as a planning unit (e.g., Smith & Wheeldon, 1999).
This would predict approximately equal loads at utterance
onset and around themiddle of the utterance. The cognitive
load may have been slightly lower before the onset of the
ﬁrst than before the onset of the second clause because
encoding of the pictures for planning of the ﬁrst clause ben-
eﬁtted from the preview of the objects at trial onset. In
addition, when speakers were planning their ﬁrst utterance
fragment they were not simultaneously speaking andmon-
itoring their own speech. However, as the participants wereexplicitly instructed tomonitor and judge their own perfor-
mance the cognitive load due to monitoring may have been
higher than in everyday speaking tasks. Future studies
might use the tapping task to examine the cognitive load
prior and during the production of different types of utter-
ances, and when speakers focus more or less on monitoring
their speech.
The main research question for the current experiment
was when participants would begin to engage in the capac-
ity demanding processes of speech planning. According to
the Early Hypothesis they should start preparing their
utterance as soon as they knew which pictures they should
describe. Therefore, tapping rates should decline soon after
the offset of the ﬁrst noun produced by speaker 1. Accord-
ing to the Late Hypothesis, speakers engage in the capacity
demanding aspects of speech planning only at the end of
the interlocutor’s turn. The analyses unambiguously sup-
port the Late Hypothesis, as the continuous model assum-
ing a decrease in tapping rate after the offset of the fourth
noun was optimal. The optimal model showed that there
was no difference in tapping rate between the two tasks
before the offset of the fourth noun of speaker 1. The addi-
tional analysis focussing on the time period around the
switch of speaker, showed that there was some overlap
between listening and speech planning, as a difference
arose from around 0.5 s before the offset of speaker 1 in
the Tapping and Speaking task. Considering the complete
duration of the turn of speaker 1 (about four seconds)
and the fact that speakers already knew which pictures
they should describe after about one second, this pattern
is more consistent with the Late than the Early Hypothesis.
The analyses of the participants’ speech onset latencies
showed that they initiated their turn later in the Tapping
and Speaking compared to the Speaking Only task. Thus,
there was evidence for mutual interference between the
two tasks. This pattern of results is in line with numerous
earlier results demonstrating that performance in dual-
task settings may reﬂect trade-offs between the tasks,
leading to performance decrements in both tasks (e.g.,
Somberg & Salthouse, 1982). There was little effect of tap-
ping on the spoken noun durations, which implies that tap-
ping did not lead to signiﬁcant motor interference. This
observation suggests that the interference between tap-
ping and speaking is mainly the result of interference at
the level of speech planning and monitoring (Kunar et al.,
2008; Oomen & Postma, 2002; Strayer & Johnston, 2001).
An additional observation was that the spoken dura-
tions of the nouns differed across the utterance positions
(note that nouns were not counterbalanced across posi-
tions, but were very similar to each other with respect to
a number of properties that may affect noun duration;
see Appendix B for detail). The second noun was longer
than the ﬁrst and third one, and the fourth noun was the
longest of all. This pattern can be readily explained by ref-
erence to the prosodic structure of the utterances: Speak-
ers tend to lengthen phrase-ﬁnal words, and utterance-
ﬁnal words receive additional lengthening (Price,
Ostendorf, Shattuck-Hufnagel, & Fong, 1991).
As noted, the increase in the speech onset latencies in
the Tapping and Speaking compared to the Speaking Only
task shows that tapping interfered with speech planning.
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cesses involved in utterance planning (identifying the
objects, selecting their names, retrieving the sound forms)
were slowed down by the additional cognitive load
imposed by the tapping task. Alternatively, speakers may
have changed their planning strategy and initiated their
speech planning later when they had to tap. We refer to
the latter hypothesis as the Delayed Refocus Hypothesis.
In other words, the additional cognitive load imposed by
the tapping task may have biased the participants toward
initiating their speech planning as late as possible. This
would be interesting in its own right, but would imply that
the tapping rates could not be seen as valid indicators of
the time course of speech planning in the absence of tap-
ping. One of the goals of Experiment 2 was to address this
concern.3. Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, the participants carried out the same
tasks as in Experiment 1, but in addition to their speech
and tapping performance their eye movements were
recorded. This was done in order to obtain corroborating
evidence about the onset of speech planning.
There is strong evidence from earlier studies demon-
strating that listeners presented with descriptions of
displays or scenes tend to look at the relevant objects. This
was ﬁrst shown in a seminal study by Cooper (1974) and
conﬁrmed in numerous experiments using the Visual
World Paradigm (Huettig, Rommers, & Meyer, 2011 for
review; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy,
1995). Similarly, many studies have shown that speakers
producing descriptions of sets of objects or of events typi-
cally look at each of the objects they refer to shortly before
naming it (Grifﬁn & Bock, 2000; Meyer, Sleiderink, & Levelt,
1998). A likely basis for this strong link between linguistic
processing and the listener’s or speaker’s eye gaze is that a
person’s point of gaze tends to correspond to their focus of
visual attention (e.g., Irwin & Gordon, 1998) and that
directing one’s visual attention to an object facilitates pro-
cessing it. Thus, listeners and speakers look at the relevant
objects because this facilitates recognition of the objects
and the retrieval of conceptual and linguistic information
about them.
Based on the evidence from earlier eye tracking studies,
we expected that the participants of the present experi-
ment should look at the relevant objects in the order of
mention. Thus, they should ﬁrst look at the objects men-
tioned by speaker 1 and then at the objects mentioned
by speaker 2. The most important question was when the
participants in the speaking tasks would begin to ﬁxate
on the objects they had to name themselves. The Early
Hypothesis predicts that this should happen as soon as
they knew which objects they should describe, which
was shortly after speaker 1 had named the ﬁrst object.
By contrast, the Late Hypothesis predicts that they should
only turn to their own objects towards the end of the turn
of speaker 1.
Given the results of Experiment 1, we expected to
obtain further support for the Late Hypothesis. Thus, withregard to the speech and tapping performance we expected
to replicate the results of Experiment 1. Additionally, we
expected that the late decline in the participants’ tapping
performance in the Tapping and Speaking task would be
accompanied by late shifts of gaze to the objects they
had to describe.
As noted above, it is possible that participants used dif-
ferent planning strategies in the Speaking Only and in the
Tapping and Speaking task, initiating their speech planning
later when they had to tap. If this is the case, the shift of
gaze to the speaker 2 objects should occur later in the Tap-
ping and Speaking than in the Speaking Only task. There-
fore, the registration of the speakers’ eye movements
allowed us not only to obtain further evidence about the
coordination of listening and speech planning, but also to
evaluate how the onset of speech planning was affected
by the tapping task.
In Experiment 1, the participants only received a few
minutes of training for the tapping task. The data from sev-
eral participants had to be excluded because they could not
combine tapping with the linguistic task. In Experiment 2,
participants received more extensive tapping training. This
should reduce the data loss in the experiment, and, since
the variability in tapping performance should be lower,
might improve the sensitivity of the tapping rate as a
measure of cognitive load.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Eighteen right-handed participants (four men) from the
participant pool at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholin-
guistics were tested. All participants were university
students, with a mean age of 21 years. They had not
participated in Experiment 1. Participants received a small
ﬁnancial reward for their participation.
3.1.2. Apparatus
An Eyelink 100 eye-tracker (SR Research) along with the
software packages Experiment Builder and Data Viewer
(SR Research) was used to record the participants’ eye
movements. Apart from this, the same equipment was
used as in Experiment 1. The movements of the right eye
were recorded with a sampling frequency of 500 Hz.
3.1.3. Materials and design
The same design and materials were used as in Experi-
ment 1. However, as a different lab was used and, due to
the use of the eye tracker, the participants sat slightly fur-
ther away from the screen than in Experiment 1, the visual
angle of the line drawings was smaller (maximally 4 deg
compared to 6 deg) and the same held for the arrows
(2.5 deg instead of 4.5 deg).
3.1.4. Procedure
As in Experiment 1, the participants were initially
familiarised with the pictures. Then the tapping training
was conducted, which was more extensive than in the ﬁrst
experiment. There were four training tasks. The ﬁrst and
fourth tasks were identical to the tasks of Experiment 1;
that is, participants had to tap until they had performed
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Fig. 5. Results of Experiment 2: Average tapping rates aligned to the
offset of speaker 1.
Table 2
Model selection values for tapping rates in Experiment 2. Models differ
with respect to the shape of the Planning predictor over time. ‘‘Base’’ refers
to the model without the planning predictor.
Predictor K W Delta_AICc
Analysis 1: Planning across the trial
N4_Continuous 26 1 0 (AICc = 66510.55)
N4_Temporary 26 0 106.07
N1_Continuous 26 0 126.34
N1_Temporary 26 0 252.23
Base 10 0 274.54
Analysis 2: Alignment of planning to speaker 1 offset
0 26 0.97 0 (AICc = 35351.28)
+0.5 26 0.02 7.34
0.5 26 0 13.53
1.0 26 0 42.56
M.J. Sjerps, A.S. Meyer / Cognition 136 (2015) 304–324 31550 consecutive correct taps. The second task consisted of
solving 38 math problems while tapping the complex pat-
tern. Participants ﬁrst saw a math problem (e.g. ‘‘11  9’’)
and after 8 s an answer (e.g. ‘‘97’’). They had to indicate
whether or not the answer was correct by saying goed (cor-
rect) or fout (wrong). The third task was to engage in an
informal 8-min conversation with the experimenter while
continuously tapping the complex pattern. The experi-
menter initiated a number of topics, such as ‘‘favourite
holiday’’ and ‘‘hobbies’’. Between the third and the fourth
training part, the participant’s knowledge of the picture
names and their handedness was assessed as in Experi-
ment 1. Different training tasks were selected in order to
render the training session as stimulating as possible for
the participants and to obtain pilot data concerning the
usefulness of the tapping task in different research context.
The procedure during the main experiment was identical
to the procedure in Experiment 1, except that the partici-
pants’ eye movements were recorded in addition to their
speech and tapping. The participants sat in front of the eye-
tracker, approximately 1 m away from the screen. Head
movements were restricted through the use of chin and




The tapping data were analysed in the same way as for
Experiment 1. Invalid taps were excluded (24% of all taps),
as were incorrect taps (9% of the valid taps). The results for
the remaining data, shown in Fig. 5, were similar to those
of Experiment 1. Again, the tapping rates in the Tapping
and Speaking and Tapping and Listening task were very
similar before and during the speaker 1 part, but differed
in the speaker 2 part. As for Experiment 1, we examined
the pattern of interference until the offset of the speaker
2 window.
The analysis approach was identical to that of Experi-
ment 1. The models again included ﬁxed main effects for
Task and Block. Four models were built that differed in a
Planning predictor representing speciﬁc planning hypothe-
ses (Early Temporary, Late Temporary, Early Continuous,
Late Continuous). A ﬁfth, baseline model did not contain
a planning predictor. Model ﬁt was evaluated using AICc
values. Interaction terms were included for the interac-
tions between the Planning predictors and Task. Random
slopes and intercepts for participants and items were
included for the interaction between Task and the Planning
predictors.
The top part of Table 2 contains the model comparison
values. As in Experiment 1, the optimal model was
‘‘N4_Continuous’’. This model contained the predictor that
assumed an increase of cognitive demand at speaker 1 off-
set, and this demand remained until the end of the speaker
2 part. The model had a signiﬁcant intercept (B = 3.32,
SE = 0.154, p < 0.001) reﬂecting the average overall tapping
rate in the Tapping and Listening task. A marginal effect
was observed for the Planning predictor (B = 0.079,
SE = 0.047, p = 0.095), suggesting a trend for tapping per-
formance to decline from the speaker 1 part to the speaker2 part in the Tapping and Listening task. This trend may be
related to the monitoring task, which focussed on the
speaker 2 part. No main effect was observed for Task
(B = 0.044, SE = 0.127, p = 0.724), indicating that, during
the speaker 1 part (where the planning predictor had value
0 and where therefore the main effect of Task was esti-
mated), Tapping and Speaking and Tapping and Listening
led to a similar rate of tapping. In contrast to the results
of Experiment 1, no signiﬁcant main effect was observed
for Block (B = 0.076, SE = 0.080, p = 0.341) showing that
the increased training in Experiment 2 prevented a further
increase in tapping rate over the experiment. A signiﬁcant
interaction was observed between Task and the Planning
predictor (B = 0.338, SE = 0.111, p = 0.002). Similar to
Experiment 1 this reﬂects the observation that in the Tap-
ping and Speaking task there was signiﬁcant interference
between speech planning and tapping right around the off-
set of the ﬁrst speaker’s turn.
As for Experiment 1, a second analysis was carried out
to examine the timing of interference in a window ranging
between 2 and +2 s from speaker 1 offset. The bottom
part of Table 2 reports the results. In the optimal model
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for the model that assumed an increase in interference
within 0.5 s after the offset of the ﬁrst speaker. The optimal
model had a signiﬁcant value for the Intercept (B = 3.260,
SE = 0.158, p < 0.001). No main effect was observed for
the Planning predictor (B = 0.035, SE = 0.046, p = 0.451),
for Task (B = 0.033, SE = 0.155, p = 0.831) or Block
(B = 0.005, SE = 0.091, p = 0.950). A signiﬁcant interaction
was observed between Task and the Planning predictor
(B = 0.437, SE = 0.113, p < 0.001). This model displays
very similar results as the previous analysis on a more
extended time window.Word
Fig. 6. Results of Experiment 2: Average noun durations per task. Error
bars reﬂect the standard error of the by-participant means.3.2.2. Speech production data
Utterances that contained missing or incorrect object
names or utterances for which the last noun was not initi-
ated at least 150 ms before the stop signal were coded as
errors. The error rates in the Tapping and Speaking and
in the Speaking Only task were 9% and 6%, respectively.
Errors were excluded from the following analyses, as were
utterances with onset latencies deviating by more than 2.5
standard deviations from the mean (3% of the data). The
average speech onset latency was longer in the Tapping
and Speaking task (390 ms (SE = 34)) than in the Speaking
Only task (329 ms (SE = 38)). This difference was tested
with a model including a ﬁxed effect for Task (with the lev-
els Tapping and Speaking and Speaking Only; where the
latter served as the reference level) and random slopes
for participants and items on Task. The analysis revealed
a signiﬁcant intercept (B = 0.330, SE = 0.038, p < 0.001),
indicating the occurrence of a pause between turns for
the Speaking Only task. In addition, an effect of Task was
observed (B = 0.059, SE = 0.021, p = 0.004) which shows
that the pause between turns was signiﬁcantly longer in
the Tapping and Speaking task compared to the Speaking
Only task.
Fig. 6 displays the average noun durations. For the anal-
ysis of noun durations the model contained the ﬁxed
effects Task and Noun (with the levels Noun 1, Noun 2,
Noun 3, Noun 4). Random slopes were included for the
two main effects and their interaction for both participants
and items, keeping the random effects structure maximal.
Model comparisons led to the exclusion of the ﬁxed effects
interaction term between Task and Noun (v2 = 2.487,
DDf = 3, p = 0.478). A signiﬁcant effect was observed for
the Intercept (B = 0.337, SE = 0.010, p < 0.001), where the
B value reﬂects the average duration for nouns in the
Speaking Only task for nouns in the ﬁrst position. No sig-
niﬁcant effect was observed for Task (B = 0.0007,
SE = 0.003, p = 0.815) as nouns did not differ signiﬁcantly
in duration across the two tasks. Signiﬁcant effects were
observed for each of the three positions (Noun 2:
B = 0.044, SE = 0.012, p < 0.001; Noun 3: B = 0.031,
SE = 0.011, p = 0.003; Noun 4: B = 0.110, SE = 0.013,
p < 0.001) reﬂecting the fact that nouns in second, third,
and fourth position were articulated more slowly than
those in ﬁrst position. The average duration of the speak-
ers’ utterances (onset of ﬁrst noun to offset of last noun)
was 2.62 s in both speaking tasks. All of these results
closely replicate the ﬁndings of Experiment 1.3.2.3. Judgement task
On 2% of the trials no judgement response was given.
For the remaining trials, participants almost always (on
more than 98% of the trials in all tasks) categorised correct
responses as such. The rates of detecting errors were 64%,
68%, and 66% for the Tapping and Speaking, the Tapping
and Listening, and the Speaking Only task, respectively.3.2.4. Eye movement data
To analyse the eye movements we deﬁned regions of
interest for each of the eight objects (0.5 cm around edges
of the objects) and categorised the participants’ ﬁxations as
falling onto any of the objects mentioned by speaker 1 or
onto any of the objects mentioned by speaker 2 or else-
where. Fixations with durations below 80 ms were dis-
carded as spurious. Subsequent ﬁxations onto the same
objects (i.e., ﬁxations to different parts of the same object)
were combined into gazes.
For each task, Fig. 7 displays the proportions of all gazes
across the trial that were directed to speaker 1 objects (top
panel) or to speaker 2 objects (bottom panel). Gazes are
aligned to trial onset. At the top of each panel indications
are provided for the minimal and maximal length of
speaker 1’s utterances (indicated with small vertical
marks). Due to the variable length of speaker 1’s utter-
ances, the onset and offset of the speaker 2 part also varied.
The earliest and latest start and end times are also indi-
cated with small vertical marks. The ﬁgure shows that
shortly after trial onset, the participants had no preference
for speaker 1 objects or speaker 2 objects. This is because
they could not anticipate which row of objects the ﬁrst
speaker would describe. After about 4 s (1 s after speaker
1 onset) they focussed mostly on the speaker 1 objects.
Towards the end of the turn of speaker 1, they tended to
shift their gaze towards the objects of speaker 2. Finally,
after the end of the speaker 2 part (when the objects were
no longer present), the participants’ looks moved away
from the interest areas, often to the stop signal displayed
in the centre of the screen. These observations conﬁrm that
the participants mostly looked at the task-relevant objects.
As long as the objects were in view, the majority of the
gazes (83%) fell within the pre-deﬁned interest areas, and
therefore the ﬁxation patterns for speaker 1 objects and
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Fig. 7. Results of Experiment 2: Proportions of gazes to the objects of speaker 1 (top panel) or the objects of speaker 2 (bottom panel), in the three tasks.
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to speaker 1 objects were accompanied by fewer gazes to
speaker 2 objects. Since we were primarily interested in
gazes to speaker 2 objects, we report analyses of the
proportions of gazes to speaker 2 objects (proportions
out of gazes to speaker 1 objects and speaker 2 objects
combined).
The gaze data were analysed in a similar way as the tap-
ping data. Two predictor variables were created, namely an
Early Planning predictor, which started at a value of 0 and
was set to a value of 1 after the offset of the ﬁrst noun of
speaker 1, and a late predictor, which also started at a
value of 0, but was set to a value of 1 only after the offset
of the fourth noun of speaker 1. Since speakers can be
assumed to keep ﬁxating objects that they are describing
we did not consider the ‘‘temporary’’ variants of the pre-
dictors. Models of gaze behaviour were ﬁtted, and the
model with the best ﬁt to the data was selected by means
of model comparisons.
The models included the ﬁxed effects Task (with the
levels Tapping and Speaking, Tapping and Listening, and
Speaking Only; with Tapping and Speaking as the reference
level), and the Planning predictors, along with their inter-
action. The interaction and main effects were also included
in the random effects structure, with slopes and intercepts
for participants and intercepts for items (inclusion of
slopes led to over-ﬁtting). Gaze data were analysed in thewindow between 3 s (picture onset) and 10 s after trial
onset.
Table 3 reports the ﬁt information for the two models.
The optimal model assumes alignment to Noun 4 offset.
This shows that across the three tasks, the shift of gaze
was more closely aligned to the offset of the fourth noun
than to that of the ﬁrst noun of speaker 1. The optimal
model had a signiﬁcant effect for the Intercept (B = 0.458,
SE = 0.024, p < 0.001), reﬂecting the overall proportion of
looks to speaker 2 objects in the Tapping and Speaking
Task before the offset of the fourth noun. A main effect
was found for the Planning predictor (B = 0.507,
SE = 0.028, p < 0.001) indicating that, in the Tapping and
Speaking task, looks to speaker 2 objects increased close
to the offset of the fourth noun of speaker 1. A main effect
was observed for Task at the level of Tapping and Listening
(B = 0.122, SE = 0.012, p < 0.001), indicating that before
the offset of the fourth noun, there were fewer looks to
speaker 2 objects in the Tapping and Listening task than
in the Tapping and Speaking task. This suggests that partic-
ipants started looking at the speaker 2 objects later when
they did not have to describe the objects themselves. In
addition, there was an interaction between Task at the
level of Tapping and Listening and the Planning predictor
(B = 0.089, SE = 0.015, p < 0.001), reﬂecting a steeper slope
of shifting gaze from speaker 1 objects to speaker 2 objects
in the Tapping and Listening than in the Tapping and
Table 3
Model selection values for models of proportions to speaker 2 objects that
only differ with respect to the timing of the Planning predictor.
Alignment K W Delta_AICc
Noun 4 18 1 0 (AICc = 12462.19)
Noun 1 18 0 12490.89
Base 8 0 13553.96
Table 4
Model selection values for models of gazes to speaker 2 objects that
differed with respect to the timing of the Planning predictor (1 to +0.5 s
relative to speaker 1 offset).
Alignment K W Delta_AICc
Tapping and speaking
0.5 7 1 0 (AICc = 623.94)
0 7 0 849.38
1.0 7 0 1398.45
+0.5 7 0 2243.41
Tapping and listening
0 7 1 0 (AICc = 2487.52)
+0.5 7 0 450.07
0.5 7 0 1326.84
1.0 7 0 2791.76
Speaking only
0.5 7 1 0 (AICc = 643.80)
0 7 0 1890.45
1.0 7 0 2145.70
+0.5 7 0 3856.45
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speaker 2 objects was slightly more gradual in the Tapping
and Speaking task than in the Tapping and Listening task.
This may partly be due to the lower proportion of looks
to speaker 2 objects in the Tapping and Listening part
during the speaker 1 part). A weak main effect was
observed for Task at the level of Speaking Only
(B = 0.044, SE = 0.020, p = 0.033), where the negative B
weight reﬂects the fact that, before the offset of the fourth
noun of speaker 1, there were fewer looks to speaker 2
objects in the Speaking Only task than in the Tapping
and Speaking task. This observation provides direct
evidence against the Delayed Refocus Hypothesis because
on this hypothesis there should be more looks to speaker
2 objects in the Speaking Only task before the offset of
the fourth noun of speaker 1.
In addition there was a weak interaction between Task
at the level of Speaking only and the Planning predictor
(B = 0.052, SE = 0.024, p = 0.034) reﬂecting a steeper slope
of shifting gaze from speaker 1 objects to speaker 2 objects
in the Speaking Only than in the Tapping and Speaking
task.
Visual inspection of the results shown in Fig. 7 sug-
gested that the shift of gaze was tightly linked to the offset
of the speech of speaker 1. To investigate the time course of
the gaze shift in more detail, an analysis was carried out
where the Late Planning predictor was aligned exactly with
the offset of the utterance or shifted by +0.5 s (i.e. occurred
slightly later in time), by 0.5 s, and by 1.0 s. For each of
the three tasks, models were compared with each of these
four predictors. Table 4 presents the results. It can be
observed that for both the Tapping and Speaking and the
Speaking only task, the shift of gaze towards speaker 2
objects was best aligned to the predictor that changed
from 0 to 1 half a second before the offset of the fourth
noun. In the Tapping and Listening task, however, looks
were more closely aligned to the offset of the fourth noun
itself.
The ﬁnal set of analyses investigated the relationship
between gazes and tapping performance. Speciﬁcally, we
explored whether in the Tapping and Speaking task the
increase in the proportion of looks to the objects the partic-
ipants had to name coincided with an increase in interfer-
ence, as captured in the tapping performance. As described
above, at trial onset the participants looked at both rows of
objects about equally often because they did not know
which row speaker 1 would describe. Therefore, the early
gazes to the speaker 2 objects were probably not directly
related to the participants’ speech planning. For the analy-
sis of the alignment of the tapping rates to the ‘‘looks for
naming’’, we determined for each trial in the Tapping andSpeaking task the onset of the gaze to a speaker 2 object
that was closest in time to the participant’s speech onset.
For the Tapping and Listening condition we determined
for every trial the onset of the gaze that was closest in time
to the onset of the utterance of the pre-recorded speaker 2.
In the Tapping and Speaking task, the participants typically
looked at the object before naming it. In the Tapping and
Listening task, however, they sometimes only looked at
the object just after it had been mentioned by speaker 2.
Tapping rates were aligned to the ﬁxation onset time that
was closest to the onset of the object name (i.e., irrespective
of whether it preceded or followed name onset, for both
tasks). Fig. 8 displays the average tapping rates in nine
0.5 s time windows around the initiation of the looks for
naming (indicated by the vertical line at 0). As can be
observed, the onset of the ﬁrst look for naming was fol-
lowed by an immediate decrease in tapping rate in the
Tapping and Speaking task, but there was no analogous
decrease in the Tapping and Listening task.
To statistically assess these patterns four Planning pre-
dictors were created for the time window from 2 s before
until 2 s after the onset of the ﬁrst look for naming. The
predictors started at value 0 and changed to 1 from
0.5 s before the onset of the critical gaze, exactly at gaze
onset (0 s), or +0.5 s, or +1 s after gaze onset and onwards.
With each of these predictors an lmer model was ﬁtted
that included the ﬁxed factors Planning predictor, Task,
and their interaction. An additional base model was ﬁtted
that had no Planning predictor in its terms. Table 5 dis-
plays the results. The optimal model assumed an increase
in dual-task interference from 0.5 s after the onset of the
critical look. However, some support was also found for
the model assuming an increase in interference immedi-
ately at the onset of the critical gaze.
The optimal model had a signiﬁcant effect for the Inter-
cept (B = 3.323, SE = 0.155, p < 0.001). No main effect was
found for the Planning predictor (B = 0.006, SE = 0.051,
p = 0.912) reﬂecting the fact that there was no change in
tapping after the +0.5 time point in the Tapping and Listen-
ing task. There was no main effect for the factor Task
(B = 0.037, SE = 0.159, p = 0.813) indicating that there
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Fig. 8. Results of Experiment 2: Average tapping rates aligned to the ﬁrst
look for naming of speaker 2 objects. Error bars reﬂect the standard error
of the by-participants means.
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tasks before the onset of looks for naming. A signiﬁcant
interaction was observed between Task and the Planning
predictor (B = 0.398, SE = 0.119, p < 0.001), which shows
that there was a signiﬁcant decrease in tapping rate for
the Tapping and Speaking task around 0.5 s after the ﬁrst
look for naming.
3.3. Discussion
In Experiment 2, the participants received more exten-
sive training in the tapping task than in Experiment 1. This
reduced the effect of the tapping task on speech onset
latencies in the comparison between the Speaking Only
and the Tapping and Speaking task (from 80 ms to
61 ms), suggesting that ample practice reduced the load
imposed by the tapping task and the interference with
speech planning. Future experiments could test whether
more extreme training regimes would eliminate the inter-
ference effect (see e.g., Spelke, Hirst, & Neisser, 1976;
Strobach, Liepelt, Pashler, Frensch, & Schubert, 2013).
However, to measure cognitive load in turn-taking set-
tings, a moderate amount of practice appears to be opti-
mal, as it leads to good performance in the task, little
data loss due to participants’ inability to perform the task,
and reliable interference effects.
With respect to the participants’ performance in the
tapping task in different parts of the trial, the main results
of Experiment 1 were replicated. Fig. 5 shows that in theTable 5
Model selection values for models of the tapping rates that differed with
respect to the timing/presence of the Planning predictor. Alignment is to
the onset of the ﬁrst looks for naming.
Alignment K W Delta_AICc
+0.5 25 0.86 0 (AICc = 32587.27)
0 25 0.14 3.65
+1.0 25 0 35.24
0.5 25 0 41.64
Base 9 0 91.24Tapping and Listening task, tapping performance during
the two listening parts differed little from each other,
and only declined in the judgement phase, when partici-
pants had to indicate whether or not the utterance pro-
duced by speaker 2 was correct. In the Tapping and
Speaking task, tapping declined only at the end of the turn
of speaker 1. This pattern conﬁrms that participants post-
poned the cognitively demanding aspects of preparing
their turn until just before they took over the turn, consis-
tent with the Late Hypothesis.
In the analyses of the participants’ speech we again
observed a delay in speech onset in the Tapping and Speak-
ing compared to the Speaking Only task, and no difference
in noun durations between these tasks. This conﬁrms that
the tapping task interfered with the preparation of the
utterance occurring before speech onset, but did not
strongly interfere with the execution of the articulatory
commands. The inﬂuence of tapping on speech preparation
is in line with the ﬁndings of Boiteau et al., despite the dif-
ferences in setting. Boiteau et al., did not measure gap
durations but reported the occurrence of overlaps (speaker
2 starts speaking before the end of the turn of speaker 1).
They found that the dual-task situation led to a decrease
of overlaps, and the average gap duration and the number
of overlaps are likely to be strongly related (smaller gaps
on average increase the likelihood of overlaps). In both
studies, therefore, interference of the secondary task on
speech production was especially observed at the start of
the speaker’s turn.
The analyses of the participants’ eye movements
showed that they looked preferentially at task-relevant
parts of the display. In the Tapping and Listening task, they
looked at the objects named by speaker 1 and speaker 2 in
the order of mention. This replicates numerous earlier
ﬁndings from studies using the Visual World Paradigm
demonstrating that listeners tend to look at objects being
named (Huettig et al., 2011). Most importantly, we found
that participants initiated ‘‘looks for naming’’ late during
the turn of speaker 1. Thus, the analyses of the participants’
tapping performance and of their eye movements both
support the Late Hypothesis. Moreover, we established
that looks to objects for naming were immediately fol-
lowed by a decrease in tapping performance. In other
words, the cognitive load increased as soon as the partici-
pants directed their visual attention to the objects they had
to name. To our knowledge, this is a novel ﬁnding, which
we consider important in its own right.
Finally, one might expect that speakers would, perhaps
strategically, postpone their speech planning in the Tap-
ping and Speaking compared to the Speaking Only task
because of the additional cognitive load imposed by the
tapping task (as per the Delayed Refocus Hypothesis).
The eye movement analyses did not support this view. In
fact, the eye movement data suggested that participants
started looking at the objects they had to name earlier in
the Tapping and Speaking task than in the Speaking Only
task. Appendix C shows that in the Tapping and Speaking
task participants gazed at the third and fourth objects of
speaker 1 less frequently than in the Speaking Only task.
That is, without a dual task setting participants may even
be more inclined to adopt a late planning strategy.
320 M.J. Sjerps, A.S. Meyer / Cognition 136 (2015) 304–3244. General discussion
Two experiments were carried out using a dual-task
paradigm involving turn-taking along with a continuous
complex tapping task. In both experiments there were
three tasks: In the Tapping and Speaking task, participants
ﬁrst listened to a pre-recorded speaker and then took over
the turn while performing a tapping task. In the Tapping
and Listening task, they overheard two pre-recorded
speakers taking turns while tapping the complex pattern.
In the Speaking Only task they listened to the ﬁrst speaker
and then took over the turn without tapping. In Experi-
ment 2, participants received more extensive tapping
training than in Experiment 1 and their eye movements
were recorded in addition to their speech and tapping per-
formance. Tapping performance was recorded to assess
variations in the cognitive load imposed by the task, and
the participants’ eye movements provided information
about their allocation of visual attention.
The main objective of the study was to investigate when
participants would begin to plan their own turn, which
should be accompanied by a decline in tapping perfor-
mance and a shift of visual attention to the objects to be
named. It is generally assumed that in natural conversa-
tions speakers often begin to plan their utterances while
listening to their interlocutor (De Ruiter et al., 2006;
Sacks et al., 1974). Given that inter-turn intervals tend to
be quite short (Heldner & Edlund, 2010; Stivers et al.,
2009), often shorter than the time a speaker would need
to plan a complex utterance from scratch (Indefrey &
Levelt, 2004; Strijkers & Costa, 2011), this assumption is
plausible. However, so far it is not substantiated by much
empirical evidence. In fact, to our knowledge, only a single
study (Boiteau et al., 2014) had investigated when, during
the turn of the interlocutor or afterwards, speakers begin
to plan their utterances. The present study complements
the work by Boiteau et al. (2014) by using a different
experimental setup. We created a situation where the
content of the utterances the participants heard and
produced was tightly controlled and where they could plan
their utterances either early, as soon they knew which
objects they had to describe, or late, close to the offset of
the ﬁrst speaker’s turn. We asked which planning strategy
the participants would prefer.
The experiments provide a clear answer to this ques-
tion: The analyses of the participants’ tapping performance
and of their eye movements showed that they began to
plan their utterance just before the end of the preceding
speaker’s turn. Thus, listening and speech planning over-
lapped, as many authors had suspected. However, the
overlap was small. Although the participants knew as soon
as speaker 1 had named the ﬁrst of four objects which
objects they should describe, they typically postponed
utterance planning by about 2 s, until speaker 1 had initi-
ated the last of the four object names.
Why did the participants opt for late utterance plan-
ning? A simple answer is that this was the easiest way to
accomplish the task. As discussed in the Introduction,
many studies have shown that speech comprehension
and production, require processing capacity (Kemperet al., 2003; Kubose et al., 2006). If participants aim to keep
their mental load at an even and relatively low level
throughout the trial, they should minimise the temporal
overlap between speaking and listening.
Against this, one may argue that the participants’
tapping performance indicated that the listening task was
low in central capacity demands. Hence, it should be easy
to combine listening and speech planning. However, this
argument overlooks the possibility that an increase in pro-
cessing load will arise when speakers plan their utterance
early and then have to hold it in working memory until the
end of the ﬁrst speaker’s turn. In addition, the processing
load may also increase substantially due to domain-
speciﬁc interference between speech planning and
listening. Numerous studies using the picture–word
interference paradigm have shown that it takes speakers
longer to name objects in the presence of spoken or written
distracter words than in the absence of such distracters
(Glaser & Düngelhoff, 1984; Schriefers, Meyer, & Levelt,
1990). This delay occurs because competition arises and
needs to be resolved between representations activated
by the distracter words and by the targets. Resolving this
competition requires processing resources (Piai, Roelofs,
& Schriefers, 2014). In other words, though listening to
speaker 1 was not particularly demanding, planning an
utterance while doing so may induce a considerable load
because of interference between the representations
activated during listening and speech planning.
In light of these considerations, one might wonder why
participants did not initiate their speech planning even
later, after the offset of the utterance of Speaker 1. The par-
ticipants’ timing of utterance planning may have been
affected by the need to complete the utterance before the
stop-signal; and in further research one might assess
how the timing of utterance planning is affected when
speakers are given more or less stringent response dead-
lines. However, we think that initiating utterance planning
just before the end of the interlocutor’s turn is likely to be a
default strategy that speakers use in many situations. It
offers a good balance between keeping the cognitive load
of concurrent listening and speaking low and being able
to respond promptly to the interlocutor.
Support for our view that speakers typically – not just in
our experiment – initiate their utterance planning shortly
before the anticipated end of the interlocutor’s turn comes
from the similarity of the results of the present study to
those obtained by Boiteau and colleagues. As described in
the Introduction, Boiteau et al. (2014) also used a dual-task
paradigm to track the capacity demands arising during turn
taking, but the two studies differed in the secondary task
(tracking a visual target versus ﬁnger tapping) and the
structure of their linguistic tasks (engaging in actual
conversation versus picture description). In spite of these
important differences, both studies led to the same main
conclusion, namely that speakers begin to plan their utter-
ance shortly before the offset of the preceding turn.
Though linking utterance planning to the anticipated
end of the preceding turn may be the speaker’s default
planning strategy, it is, of course, not mandatory. There
are undoubtedly situations where speakers have fully
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rupted by the interlocutor) and situations where they are
literally speechless long after the preceding turn has
ended. There are many variables that could potentially
affect the speakers’ timing of utterance planning, includ-
ing, for instance, the pressure to respond fast (Roberts &
Francis, 2013; Swets et al., 2013), the intelligibility and
complexity of the preceding turn, the speaker’s linguistic
ability, and working memory capacity. An important task
for further research is to ﬁnd out which, if any, of these
variables actually affect the onset of speech planning and
the speed and efﬁciency of planning. Moreover, the pro-
posal that speech planning is linked to the anticipated
end of the interlocutor’s turn presupposes that the speaker
can indeed predict when the turn will end. This may be
easier in some situations than in others. Thus, another
important research question is how well speakers can pre-
dict the ends of turns, which variables they use to do so
(see e.g., De Ruiter et al., 2006), and how the predictability
of ends of turns affects their speech planning.
Evidently, using a Late Planning strategy implies that
the speaker cannot fully plan a complex utterance before
the end of the interlocutor’s turn. So far, very little is
known about speakers’ planning spans in natural conversa-
tions. Studies have shown that speakers are highly ﬂexible
in their use of advance planning strategies and planning
increments (Ferreira & Swets, 2002; Konopka, 2012;
Swets et al., 2013), and that they often initiate utterances
based on partial utterance plans, corresponding, for
instance, to a subject noun phrase. Analyses of corpora of
casual speech also indicate that speakers often have not
fully planned their turns, but need to buy time for further
planning by producing ﬁllers such as ‘‘ehm’’, which
accounted for about 3.5% of all spoken words in a sample
by Torreira, Adda-Decker, and Ernestus (2010; see also
Clark & Fox Tree, 2002). These observations are consistent
with the view that late planning is a default strategy
speakers use in many situations. We predict that speakers,
rather than beginning to plan early, initiate complex utter-
ances on the basis of partial utterance plans.
The current report and the report by Boiteau et al. dem-
onstrate that both complex tapping and the visual-motor
tracking task can be used to track the capacity demands
of speaking and listening over time. One may ask which
of these tasks is preferable for a speciﬁc research question.
The visual-motor tracking task has better temporal resolu-
tion than the tapping task (here 0.5 s), although the tempo-
ral resolution of complex tapping can be improved by
increasing the number of observations. Another advantage
of the tracking task is that it is easy to manipulate task dif-
ﬁculty by changing the speed of the moving target. The
tapping task is somewhat more versatile as it is not depen-
dent on exogenous stimuli. Therefore it can, for instance,
be used when participants are engaged in natural conver-
sation with mutual eye contact or when they need to look
at a screen to carry out a linguistic task. Depending on the
research question, a tracking task or complex tapping may
be preferred. The study by Boiteau and colleagues and the
present study have extended the set of available research
tools, now allowing for further investigations of the time
course of cognitive demands in dialog settings.The linguistic tasks in the two studies differed markedly
in the constraints on the utterance content set for the
participants. Whereas the participants in the study by
Boiteau et al. engaged in informal conversations about
everyday topics, the participants of the present study
heard and produced descriptions of simple drawings. In
spite of this marked difference in the way the utterances
were elicited the main conclusion of both studies was the
same. Clearly, the speakers’ tendency to initiate utterance
planning time-locked to the offset of the preceding speak-
er’s turn is quite pervasive and is seen regardless of how
the utterances are elicited. Other aspects of utterance plan-
ning and resource allocation during speaking and listening
may well be sensitive to the way utterances are elicited.
Researchers need to decide which way of eliciting utter-
ances is most suitable for assessing their hypotheses, and
in particular how important it is in the speciﬁc research
context to control which utterances participants hear and
produce.
Perhaps the most striking difference between the stud-
ies lies in the social context provided in the experiments,
i.e. whether the participants produced utterances directed
at a confederate or friend (Experiments 1 and 2, respec-
tively, in the study by Boiteau and colleagues), or listened
to and responded to pre-corded utterances (the study
reported here). In the present set of studies, these tasks
led to very similar conclusions. Again, however, other
aspects of sentence planning may very well depend on
the social situation in which the utterances are produced.
As most experimental psycholinguistics has focussed on
monologues, hardly anything is known about the way lan-
guage comprehension and production processes are
affected by the presence or absence of an interlocutor. At
the moment, researchers need to rely on their best judge-
ment to decide whether or not their speciﬁc research ques-
tion is best addressed using procedures that do or not
involve a confederate or testing participants interaction
with each other. Ideally, important theoretical questions
should be studied in more than one way.
5. Conclusions
It has often been proposed that smooth transitions
between turns in natural dialogue require speakers to plan
their utterances while listening to the preceding speaker.
Our experiments conﬁrmed that this view is correct, as
there was indeed some temporal overlap between listening
and speech planning. However, our results also showed
that speakers only initiated the cognitively demanding
aspects of speech planning when their interlocutor’s turn
was almost completed. We propose that such late utter-
ance planning may be a default strategy speakers adopt
in many situations. Planning while listening may therefore
be less pervasive than one might think.
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Appendix A. Materials
Dutch names with English translation equivalents. Lists
were created such that semantic overlap between lists was
minimal.
List 1: vlinder (butterﬂy), leeuw (lion), spin (spider), ﬂes
(bottle), hond (dog).
List 2: appel (apple), banaan (banana), peer (pear), doos
(box), aardbei (strawberry).
List 3: zaag (saw), schaar (scissors), lepel (spoon), kaars
(candle), vork (fork).Table B1
Average length and log frequency of the dominant name, taken from the picture corp
positions on the speaker 2 row of objects (standard deviations between brackets).
Measure Position
Noun 1 Noun 2
Number of syllables 1.24 (0.34) 1.26 (0
Number of phonemes 4.0 (0.86) 4.01 (0
Log frequency 1.47 (0.50) 1.47 (0
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Fig. C1. Experiment 2: Proportions of gazes to the four objects of speaker 1 (top pane
Speaking (solid lines) and the Speaking Only (dotted lines) task. Gazes are aligned tList 4: muur (bricks), dak (roof), sleutel (key), vlag (ﬂag),
tent (tent).
List 5: bril (glasses), helm (helmet), schoen (shoe), gita-
ar (guitar), pet (hat).
List 6: clown (clown), voet (foot), robot (robot), spiegel
(mirror), ballon (balloon).
List 7: cactus (cactus), blad (leaf), boom (tree), pijp
(pipe), bloem (ﬂower).
List 8: ﬁets (bicycle), bus (bus), trein (train), ring (ring),
kaas (cheese).Appendix B. Item properties
See Table B1.
Appendix C
See Fig. C1.us by Severens et al. (2005), for the names of the pictures in the four
Noun 3 Noun 4
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l) and the four objects of speaker 2 (bottom panel) in the Tapping and
o speaker 1 offset (at 0 s).
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